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NOTES AND COMMENT
Although the courts have not said the burden is on the insured
to prove the performance of conditions precedent or the truth of his
material representations, they have placed upon him the duty of going
forward with the proof after the insurer has given evidence of a
breach of a representation. The recent decisions have achieved
that result.38
Not being able to waive the physician's immunity, the beneficiary
in life policies often finds it hard to overcome the prima facie case
which the insurer is allowed to prove without overstepping the bounds
of privilege. The result of this is, in many cases, the obstruction of
justice and a concealment of the facts.39 The legislature by allowing
such beneficiaries the right to waive the privilege would overcome
this defect.
LEO F. BOLAND.

AUTOMOBILES-MANSLAUGHTER

IN

FIRST DEGREE-INTOXICATED

DRIVER.

Manslaughter is defined as homicide not amounting to murder
in the first or second degree, or justified or excusable homicide.' It
is specifically defined in its most common form by Section 1050, Subdivision 1, of the New York Penal Law as homicide committed without a design to effect death while engaged in committing or attempting
to commit a misdemeanor affecting the person or property either of
the person killed or of another. 2
sSupra note 34.
(1933) 12 ORE. L. RFv. 216, quotes from a letter from Professor Wigmore on the subject of privilege:
"For two centuries it has been settled in the law of evidence that
confidential communications as such are not entitled to any brivilege.
The administration of justice must get at the facts of the controversy,
or else it is blocked. Any privilege is a distinct exception. The privilege
that was established some years ago in many states for communications
between medical men and patients has proved to be nothing but an
obstruction of justice; it obstructs the ascertainment of facts in insurance cases and in personal injury cases and in most instances its application makes a laughing stock of the law of evidence; nor was it
justified by any necessity."

IN. Y.

(1909) §1049.
v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E. 79 (1926) ; People v. Darragh, 141 App. Div. 408, 126 N. Y. Supp. 522 (1st Dept. 1910), aff'd, 203 N. Y.
527, 96 N. E. 1124 (1911); People v. Stacy, 119 App. Div. 743, 104 N. Y.
Supp. 615 (3d Dept. 1907), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 577, 85 N. E. 1112 (1908) ; People
v. Harris, 74 Misc. 353, 134 N. Y. Supp. 409 (1911); People v. McKeon, 31
Hun 449 (N. Y. 1884).
2People
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This statute is intended to protect society from killings which
arise out of misdemeanors of such a nature that, when they are commenced, they are directed against person or property. 3 The crime of
manslaughter is repugnant to human nature and properly merits a
drastic punishment. 4 But it is not fitting that a person should be
convicted of manslaughter in the first degree for a death which is
not readily foreseeable as a natural consequence of the commission
of the misdemeanor. For example: A, while driving an automobile
at a rate of speed in excess of the speed limit in the locality, struck
and killed B who stepped into the path of A's car in such close
proximity that A was unable to stop in time to avoid striking B. If
A was not driving at a speed which would constitute gross or culpable
negligence, he cannot be convicted of manslaughter in the second
degree.
The majority of jurisdictions have held that to kill a person in
the course of driving an automobile in an intoxicated condition is
gross or culpable negligence. 5 What constitutes gross or culpable
negligence is a subject of a variety of interpretations.6
In New
York, it is accepted as meaning a great deal more than negligence
sufficient to support a civil action 7 but less than a wanton disregard

for human life or safety.8

In other words, it is a question of degree.

The New York Vehicle and Traffic Law is designed to protect
the people of this state from injury to person or property due to
any unlawful use of motor vehicles or other means of transportation
on its highways. At first glance it would appear that a violation of
IN. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §1050, subd. 1; People v. Grieco, 266 N. Y.
48, 193 N. E. 635 (1934).
'N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §1051. Manslaughter in the first degree is
punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years.
Id. §1053. Manslaughter in the second degree is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding fifteen years, or by a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars.
King v. Commonwealth, 253 Ky. 775, 70 S. W. (2d) 667 (1934) ; Morris
v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 276, 73 S. W. (2d) 1 (1934); People v. Townsend,
214 Mich. 267, 183 N. W. 177 (1921); State v. Horner, 266 Mo. 109, 180
S. W. 873 (1915) ; State v. Rountree, 181 N. C. 535, 106 S. E. 669 (1921) ;
State v. Palmer, 197 N. C. 135, 147 S. E. 817 (1929); State v. Stansell, 203
N. C. 69, 164 S. E. 580 (1932).
1 Culpable negligence is something more than the slight negligence necessary to support a civil action for damages and means a disregard of the
consequences which may ensue from the act and an indifference to the right of
others. People v. Angelo, 246 N. Y. 451, 159 N. E. 394 (1927).
Gross negligence is the want of even slight care and diligence. White v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 14 Fed. 710 (C. C. D. Kan. 1897); McGrath v.
Hudson River R. R. Co., 19 How. Prac. 211 (N. Y. 1860); Seybel v.
National Currency Bank, 54 N. Y. 288 (1873).
A reasonable degree of care is required of a person to successfully defend
a civil action.
'A charge of murder in the first degree may be predicated on an act
which is imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without a design to effect death. N. Y. PENAL
LAW (1909) §1044, subd. 2.
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any of its prohibitions would constitute a misdemeanor affecting
person or property, but it must be kept in mind that this statute is
fundamentally intended for the protection of the people as a whole
and secondarily for that of the individual. 9 Violations of its prohibitions, except in so far as they are designated by it as felonies, are
misdemeanors. 10 An analysis of Section 1050 of the Penal Law
reveals that the misdemeanors referred to therein are such that
affect either the individual killed or his property, or affect another
or his property."
A strict construction of this statute would require an affirmance
in People v. Grieco,12 but since it must be liberally construed,' 3 the
court held that the statute did not include a misdemeanor affecting
society as a whole, 14 and reversed the conviction. In that case the
defendant was driving an automobile while intoxicated when he
struck two persons who were standing in a safety zone, killing one
and injuring the other, and then struck another automobile. Grieco
was indicted for manslaughter in the first degree and for violations
of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, Sections 58 15 and 70, Subdivision 5.1
On the trial, the court charged the jury that to drive an
automobile while intoxicated is, as a matter of law, a misdemeanor
affecting the person or property either of the person killed or of
another within the meaning of Section 1050, Subdivision 1, of the
Penal Law. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, saying
that the misdemeanor charged was not sufficient to support manslaughter in the first degree. 17 The court, however, did not deny
that the indictment found against Grieco would support the crime
charged, but expressly finds that the driving of an automobile while
intoxicated, is a misdemeanor not specifically directed against an
individual.' 8

'People v. Grieco, supra note 3.
11N. Y. VEicIC AND TRAFFIc LAW (1929) §§16, 17, subds. 2, 5; §§57, 58,
65, subd. 1; §§66, 70, subds. 1-9; §§74, 93, 94b; N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §29.
IN. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §1050.
* * * Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree, when committed
without a design to effect death;
"1:-By a person engaged in committing or attempting to commit a
misdemeanor affecting the person or property either of the person killed.
or of another; or
* ,

"2:_*

2Supra note 3.

" N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §21.
" People v. Grieco, supra note 3.
"Defines reckless driving as a misdemeanor.
"0Defines driving while intoxicated as a misdemeanor, unless the person
charged therewith has been previously convicted of the same offense, in which
case it becomes a felony.
"'People v. Grieco, supra note 3.
"8Ibid.
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Assault in the third degree1 9 is the outstanding example of a
misdemeanor affecting a person; unlawful entry 2 0 of a misdemeanor
affecting property. But, it will be noticed, here there is either a
specific intent,2 ' or an implied intent 2 2 necessary to commit the
misdemeanor. This intent runs directly from the person acting, to
and against the property or the individual.

In People v. Stacy,2 3 the

defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree. He
had assaulted and beaten his wife and as a result thereof she died.
The court held that this was assault in the third degree, 24 and was
sufficient to sustain a conviction of manslaughter in the first degree.2 5
When the decision in the Grieco case is considered from the
view of an injury to property, the fact that there was an injury to
property of another person allows the reasoning of 2 the
court
6
to be applied equally to misdemeanors affecting property.
The question, therefore, now is whether our statute, 27 as it now
stands, is sufficient to include the inebriated driver of an automobile
who runs down and kills a pedestrian, or otherwise kills a person
using the public highways. The court pointed out in the Grieco case
that the defendant could have been indicted for assault in the third
degree 28 or manslaughter in the 'second degree. 29 The30 sole charge
was manslaughter in the first degree under two counts.
In the prevailing opinion by Hubbs, J., the court said,
"A moment before the collision, the defendant's conduct
constituted a crime, a misdemeanor against society, against
law and order, and against the people of this state. The
"N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §244.
"Id.
§405. entry requires that the person committing the misdemeanor
"Unlawful
have the specific intent to enter the premises and commit a felony. Supra
note 20.
Assault in the third degree requires a specific intent to inflict a bodily
injury. Supra note 19, subd. 1.
Assault in the third degree under the second subdivision of §244 implies
an intent to inflict the bodily injury when there is culpable negligence shown.
"Supra note 2; see also, People v. McKeon, supra note 2, where the
defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree for a death which
resulted from an assault and battery.
" "Nor is it apparent how any substantial rights of the defendant have
been prejudiced by the failure to allege the conclusion that the defendant was
engaged in the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor." People v. Stacy,
119 App. Div. 743, 748, 104 N. Y. Supp. 615 (3d Dept., 1907). The indictment
was sustained. Ibid.
"People v. Stacy, sutpra note 2.
"Grieco also ran into an automobile belonging to a third party.
'Supra note 11.
Supra note 25.
"N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §1052.
Manslaughter in the first degree committed while driving in an intoxicated condition; and manslaughter in the first degree committed while driving
recklessly.
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conclusion of the misdemeanor was not one affecting the person or property of the person killed or of another." 3,
This is a holding which construes the statute 32 to include only those
misdemeanors which directly and primarily affect the person or property of an individual, for the court continues,
"He had not seen the deceased and did not know that she
was present. The fact that his automobile struck her could
not instantly change his conduct so as to make it an act affecting the person of the deceased and thereby make him liable for
manslaughter in the first degree." 33
Therefore, if the misdemeanor charged is not such a misdemeanor
that it is primarily directed against an individual's person or property
and a person is killed thereby, that misdemeanor cannot be the basis
for a charge of manslaughter in the first degree.3 4 O'Brien, J.,
dissented from the reversal in this case, however, and said,
"The fact that the defendant did not intentionally run
down the deceased does not appear to have any relevancy to
the case. The gravamen of the misdemeanor is the failure to
exercise the care of the reasonably prudent man. If he failed
to see his victim when he should have seen her, he committed
this misdemeanor. The question is, therefore, whether the
commission of this misdemeanor was such a one as 'affected'
the person or property either of Mrs. Burgess or of another.
* * * Not only did defendant's commission of the misdemeanor
as defined in Section 58 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law offend
against society in general, but it affected the person of Mrs.
Burgess and simultaneously affected the person of Mrs. Briant
and almost instantaneously affected the property of the owner
of the car with which defendant collided." 35
But the conduct which directly affected the person of the deceased
and Mrs. Briant was the fact that the defendant drove his car through
the safety zone, which is not a misdemeanor, but is an unlawful act.8 6
As applied to this case, Section 21 of the Penal Law is to be
construed to intend a liberal interpretation of the Penal Law against
the state and in favor of the person indicted. The decision in the
Grieco case, at first glance, seems to be a strained construction of
s'People v. Grieco, supra note 3, at 51, N. E. at 635.
Supra note 11.

People v. Grieco, supra note 3, at 52, N. E. at 635.
People v. Grieco, supra note 3.
People
v. Grieco,AND
supra
note 3,LAW
at 55,(1929)
N. E. §87,
at 637.
"0N.
Y. VEHICLE
TRAFFIC
subd. 2.

'
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the statute 3 7 but, when carefully considered, is merely a liberal
interpretation of its terms. If, however, it is the legislative intent
that to kill a person, while driving an automobile in an intoxicated
condition, shall constitute manslaughter in the first degree, the statute
should be amended.
JOHN

A.

REAGAN, JR.

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE TO PLEDGEES
AND PURCHASERS UNDER THE NEW YORK FACTORS' AcT.'

In a recent New York case,2 the plaintiff, a dealer engaged in
the business of buying and selling jewelry, delivered to another
dealer in the same business, a diamond ring. The dealer signed the
following memorandum: "These goods are sent for your inspection
and remain our property and are to be returned to us on demand.
Sale takes effect only from date of our approval of your selection."
The dealer pledged the ring with the defendant as security for a loan
of $125.00. The defendant advanced the money to the dealer in
good faith and without knowledge of the plaintiff's ownership. In
an action of replevin, against the pledgee, the validity of the pledge
under the New York Factors' Act,3 was set up as a defense. The
defendant attempted to show by parol that the ring was delivered to
the dealer for the purpose of sale to such customer as he could find;
and that he was merely obligated to return either the goods or the
proceeds. The plaintiff contended that these facts were inadmissible
under the parol evidence rule. Upon an agreed statement of facts,
the question was submitted to the Appellate Division, 4 which held
that the evidence should have been excluded. The Court of Appeals
IN. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §1050.
IN. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1909) §43.
2 Nelkin v. Provident Loan Society of N. Y., 265 N. Y. 393, 193 N. E.
245 (1934).
IN. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1909) §43, subd. 1: Every factor or other

agent, entrusted with the possession of any bill of lading, custom-house permit,

or warehouseman's receipt for the delivery of any merchandise, and every such
factor or agent not having the documentary evidence of title, who shall be
intrusted with the possession of any merchandise for the purpose of sale, or as
a security for any advances to be made or obtained thereon, shall be deemed to
be true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any contract made by such
agent with any other person, for the sale or disposition of the whole or any
part of such merchandise and any account receivable or other chose in action
created by sale or other disposition of such merchandise, for any money
advanced, or negotiable instrument or other obligation in writing given by
such other person upon the faith thereof.
'Nelkin v. Provident Loan Society, 241 App. Div. 875, 271 N. Y. Supp.
314 (2d Dept. 1934).

